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KYLES v. WHITLEY
115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Six witnesses told New Orleans police that at approximately 2:20
p.m. on September20,1984 they saw ayoung black man accost sixty year
old Dolores Dye as she unloaded groceries into the trunk of her red Ford
LTD. 1 The assailant reportedly struggled with Dye in the grocery store
parking lot before he reached to his waist, drew a revolver, and fired a
fatal shot into Dye's left temple. Using Dye's car keys, the attacker drove
away in the LTD.2
On December 7, 1984, a jury convicted Curtis Lee Kyles
of first degree murder of Dolores Dye and sentenced him to death.3
Kyles' conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court on direct appeal despite Kyles' steadfast claim of
innocence. 4 Specifically, Kyles maintained that he was framed by the
State's informant, Joseph "Beanie" Wallace.
Kyles had been arrested based upon information Beanie supplied to
the police. At Beanie's urging, police searched Kyles' apartment and
found the murder weapon hidden behind the stove, a homemade holster
in a closet, and certain distinctive groceries from the store where Dye
shopped.5 Also based on Beanie's tip, the police had searched Kyles'
garbage and found Dye's purse and its contents. Kyles' prints were
detected on one of twd grocery sales slips found inside the stolen Ford.
The State also relied upon the enlargement of a crime scene photograph
taken soon after the murder that allegedly depicted Kyles' car in the faint
background.6 This evidence aside, the heart of the State's case against
Kyles consisted of eyewitness testimony.7 Four of the State's six
eyewitnesses testified at trial and positively identified Kyles as the
gunman in front of the jury.8
During state collateral review, Kyles became aware that the State
had not disclosed the following evidence: (1) certain inconsistent eyewit-
ness statements and descriptions; (2) a transcript of Beanie's recorded
first interview with police; (3) a written statement signed by Beanie after
the above police interview; (4) notes taken by the prosecutor during the
pre-trial interview with Beanie; (5) a policememorandum directing
officers to pick up the defendant's garbage; (6) evidence of Beanie's
record of involvement in crimes of this nature; and (7) the police's list of
license plate numbers of cars parked in the grocery store lot after the
police arrived at the murder scene.9
Of critical importance to the defense were the unrevealed state-
ments made by the four witnesses that suggested Kyles was not the
gunman.10 In particular, two witnesses supplied accounts contempora-
neous to the crime which cast doubt on their trial testimony. One witness
had originally claimed that he briefly saw the gunman in the LTD only
after the murder, but at trial the witness testified that he observed the
1Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1560 (1995).
2Id.
3 The first jury to hear Kyles' case was unable to reach a verdict after
four hours of deliberation; the state's case ended in a mistrial. Kyles'
conviction was the result of the second trial. Id. at 1559-60.
4 State v. Kyles, 513 So. 2d 265 (La. 1987).
5 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1562.
6 1d. at 1563-64.
7 Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 853 (1993).
81d.
9 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1563.
preceding struggle. The second witness had first described the gunman
as younger, shorter, and less slender than Kyles. Both witnesses also said
that the gunman had braids rather than Kyles' "bush" hairstyle. These
descriptions of the gunman's physical characteristics better matched
Beanie than Kyles.11
Beanie's unrevealed interaction with the New Orleans police also
was important because the information he provided was critical to the
police investigation. Beanie had contacted the police two days after
Dye's murder and supplied them with their first lead. In their first
meeting, Beanie told police that he had purchased the victim's red Ford
LTD for $400 from a man he called "Curtis" at 6:00 p.m. the night after
themurder. 12 Beanie claimed thathe didnotknow thecarwas stolen until
his relatives told him that the local media identified the car as belonging
to the recent murder victim. During the interview Beanie told the police
that he and his "partner"1 3 had helped Kyles unload groceries and a
Woman's brown purse from the LTD's back seat and trunk into the home
of Kyles' common-law wife.14
Although he appeared to be nervous that he might be implicated in
the crime, Beanie was quick to make sure that he would be reimbursed
for his $400 expenditure. 15 Once he was reassured that he would be so
compensated, Beanie zealously worked to help the police snare Kyles.
Indeed, Beanie, who had been in Kyles' apartment after the murder,
supplied the police with information about the gun they would find at
Kyles' residence; more incredibly, Beanie suggested to police that Kyles
might put Dye's purse in the garbage can in front of his home and then
supplied the police with the time of Kyles' next garbage pick-up. Beanie
also went to the site of the murder with police and alleged that Kyles' car
had remained parked in the lot until the day after the murder when he went
with Kyles to retrieve it.
16
In the early hours of September 23, 1984, Beanie prepared a written
statement for police in which he inconsistently alleged both that Kyles
removed the brown purse from the front seat of the stolen vehicle when
he was unloading the groceries and that Kyles had recovered the brown
purse later in the night from the scene of the crime. 17 In his third pre-trial
interview, Beanie's story changed again; Beanie told the State's chief
prosecutor that he and others helped Kyles retrieve his car from the scene
of the crime in the early evening on the date of the murder rather than the
next night. 18
The State also failed to disclose a list of suspect automobiles that
tended to discredit the prosecution's theory that it presented to the jury
as evidence of Kyles' guilt. In keeping with its theory that the assailant
drove his car to the scene of the crime and left it there until some later date,
the police took inventory of the license plates of the cars in the grocery
store lot shortly after the murder. Although the State alleged that a grainy
10 d. at 1569.
111d. at 1569-70.
12 Id. at 1561.
13 The man Beanie referred to as "partner" was later identified as
Kyles' brother-in-law, Johnny Bums. Id.
14Id. at 1561-62.
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photograph showed Kyles' car, in fact the list of the cars in the lot
indicated that Kyles' car was not at the scene of the crime. 19
The Supreme Court ofLouisianagrantedKyles' petition for the trial
court to hold an evidentiary hearing based on the newly discovered
evidence.20 Kyles asserted that the State had an affirmative duty to
disclose this favorable evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland21 and
that there was a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of his trial
would have been different had the State disclosed the exculpatory
evidence to the defense. In spite of the new evidence, the trial court
denied relief and the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to grant discre-
tionary review. 22
Kyles' petition for federal habeas relief was similarly unsuccessful;
both the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition. In her dissent
from the Fifth Circuit's opinion, however, Judge King wrote: '[f]or the
first time in my fourteen years on this court ... I have serious reservations
about whether the State has sentenced to death the right man."23
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used the proper standard
to evaluate the defendant's Brady claim. 24 The Court held that the
Brady evaluation turns on the potential cumulative effect of all of
the suppressed evidence favorable to the defense.25 The Court also
summarily rejected the State's suggestion that the defendant's
failure to request any or all of the exculpatory evidence releases the
government from its duty to disclose such evidence.
26
The Court then clarified the nature and scope of the prosecution's
duty under this cumulative Brady standard. First, the Court held that
the prosecutor's affirmative duty to disclose Brady evidence cannot
depend on each piece of evidence viewed in isolation, but turns on
the potential cumulative effect of the evidence.27 Second, the Court
charged the prosecution to use its discretion to gauge accurately the
likely net effect of the evidence; the prosecutor must disclose
evidence when there is a "reasonable probability" that the result of
the proceeding might hinge upon the disclosure of that evidence.
2 8
Third, the Court held that each individual prosecutor, in executing
this responsibility, has a corresponding affirmative duty to learn of
any exculpatory evidence known to others acting on the government's
behalf.29 Finally, the Court also made clear that Brady evidence
includes evidence bearing on the thoroughness and good faith of the
police investigation.
30
19 Id. at 1573-74.
20 Id. at 1560.
21 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
22State ex. rel. Kyles v. Butler, 566 So. 2d 386 (La. 1990).
23 Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d at 820.
24 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1560.
25 1d. at 1567.
261d. at 1565 (referring to its decision in UnitedStates v.Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976)).
27 Id. at 1567.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1567-68.
30 Id. at 1569 n.13.
3 11d. at 1574.
32 Id. at 1566.
33 Id. at 1560.
34 Id. (The Court cited to Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) for
the proposition that the court's duty to search for constitutional error is
enhanced when the defendant faces capital punishment).
Upon reviewing the undisclosed evidence in Kyles' case, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
had not correctly taken into account the cumulative approach to
materiality required by Brady. Emphasizing that Brady materiality
does not turn on proof that the defendant would have been acquit-
ted,3 1 the Court declared that the "touchstone of materiality" is
whether the defendant received a fair trial resulting in a verdict
worthy of confidence. 32 The Court found that the evidence in




At the outset of its opinion, the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the heightened standard of scrutiny for capital cases.34 Much
to the dissent's chagrin, the Court delved into a record of complex facts
and reversed the Fifth Circuit even though the Fifth Circuit had purported
to apply the very standard that the Supreme Court relied upon to reverse
the conviction. 35 Although such fact-intensive review by the Supreme
Court is not likely to become commonplace, the Court's opinion appears
intended to add a strong new dimension to BradylBagley materiality.
Evaluation of a Brady claim continues to be guided by the
materiality of the evidence as that term is defined in United States
v. Bagley.3 6 That is, evidence becomes material when it becomes
reasonably probable that its suppression will affect the result of the
trial.37 In Kyles v. Whitley, however, the Supreme Court stressed
that the Bagley materiality standard was not intended to operate in
a vacuum where each piece of evidence is evaluated in isolation. 38
Rather, the cumulative approach is essential to materiality analysis
because individual pieces of evidence accumulate and lend subtle
meaning to the facts as a whole.
Kyles requires prosecutors to disclosebothrequested and unrequested
favorable evidence "'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." 39 Rejecting the State's suggestion that the
prosecutor should be held to some lesser standard because of the
difficulty of such an evaluation, the Court treated the prosecutor's
discretionary power as a privilege rather than a handicap. 40 Because the
prosecution must now plan for the possibility that the police might not
disclose all of its Brady evidence, and yet the- prosecution remains
responsible for it, Kyles should increase the amount of information that
35 The Court, however, thought that it was unclear whether the
majority of the lower court properly assessed the cumulative effect of
evidence or whether it erred by making a series of independent materi-
ality evaluations. "There is room to debate whether the two judges in the
majority in the Court of Appeals made an assessment of the cumulative
effect of the evidence." Id. at 1569.
36 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
37 According to Bagley, a different verdict is "reasonably probable"
when the state's suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of
the trial." 473 U.S. at 678.
38 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1567.
39 Id. at 1565 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).
40 Louisiana asked for "a certain amount of leeway in making a
judgment call," claiming that the process was too difficult for the
prosecutor to be held strictly accountable. Id. at 1568 (quoting the
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33).
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the defense will receive from the prosecution.4 1 As the Court anticipated
in its opinion, "a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind
will disclose a favorable piece of evidence."
42
Kyles' broad mandate creates the opportunity to make a number of
narrowly tailored requests for disclosure that will pressure the prosecution
to step up its own investigation and preserve Brady issues for appeal. The
following five devices are designed to take advantage of Kyles' language
and can easily be incorporated into standard discovery requests.
1. A defense discovery motion should directly request any and
all evidence that alone or in conjunction with other evidence of any
character may cast doubt upon the defendant's guilt.
The defense's general tactic afterKyles is to ask the prosecution to
disclose all variations of exculpatory evidence. Because evidence is
interactive, one piece of evidence may act conjunctively with another
piece of evidence to produce this exculpatory effect. By asking for
evidence that acts "alone or in conjunction with other evidence," the
defense may reap the full benefits of the cumulative approach empha-
sized in Kyles.43
2. A defense discovery motion should directly request any and
all exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution, includ-
ing all exculpatory information gathered by any formal or informal
state or federal investigation.
Kyles makes clearthat the prosecutormust account for all Common-
wealth actors and any exculpatory evidence gathered by those actors in
order to fulfill its responsibility: "mhe individual prosecutor has a duty
to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police."44 In order to
target all possible lines of communication flowing to the prosecutor,
defense attorneys in their discovery motions should request such infor-
mation from all law enforcement actors.
3. A defense discovery motion should directly request any and
all information that alone or in conjunction with other evidence calls
into question the credibility of the government's case, including but
not limited to information that indicates that the testimony of a
prosecution witness is inconsistent with other information in the
government's actual or constructive possession.
Information that calls into question the credibility of any prosecu-
tion participant is obviously useful to the defense. Accordingly, defense
attorneys should require prosecutors to reveal if the testimony of two or
more prosecution witnesses is inconsistent. Similarly, evidence that a
witness made inconsistent statements or was formerly unable to recall
information or identify the defendant is exculpatory. Again, Kyles' fact
41 Making the prosecutor accountable for all Brady evidence
associated with the government's case narrows the prosecutor's margin
of error. Because appellate review may reveal new information (formerly
unknown to the prosecutor) about the police investigation, and because
the prosecutor must take into account exculpatory evidence that may
later come to light, the prosecutor's motivation to reveal all exculpatory
evidence from the beginning is enhanced.
42 Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1568.
43 The Kyles Court concluded that the suppressed exculpatory
evidence "would not have functioned as mere isolated bits of good luck
for Kyles. [The evidentiary items'] combined force in attacking the
process by which the police gathered evidence and assembled the case
would have complemented, and have been complemented by, the testi-
pattern and holding make it absolutely clear that even if a lone inconsis-
tency may not be "materially" exculpatory, it may reach that level if
viewed in the context of other potentially exculpatory information.
4. A defense discovery motion should directly request any
evidence that the defense may use, alone or in conjunction with other
evidence, that bears on the character or quality of the police inves-
tigation; specifically, the discovery motion should request any evi-
dence of other informants, leads, and suspects, including but not
limited to evidence that the police did not pursue certain leads or
suspects.
The Kyles Court specifically stated that the prosecution has a duty
to disclose material exculpatory evidence that the defense might use to
attack the character and substance of the Commonwealth's investigation.
In short, evidence of shoddy policework can be exculpatory evidence for
the defendant. 45
There are any number of ways defense counsel can induce disclo-
sure of mistake or bad faith in a police investigation. Requests are best
directed at evidence regarding other potential or actual suspects, leads
and informants that the police were aware of, and prior inconsistent
statements or identifications. As the Kyles Court suggests, evidence that
police did not pursue certain suspects or leads directly relates to the
quality of the investigation and may be exculpatory to the defense.
46
5. A defense discovery motion should directly request any
evidence that alone or in conjunction with other evidence may be
exculpatory in arguing for a sentence less than death, including but
not limited to information concerning the Commonwealth's theory
of vileness or future dangerousness, including unadjudicated acts.
Because the disparity between the Commonwealth's resources and
the defendant's resources continues into the sentencing phase of a trial,
defense attorneys must remember to utilize Brady requests for the
entirety of the Commonwealth's case. If the suppressed evidence is
material to the defendant's punishment, the prosecutor has a duty to
disclose the evidence under Brady.47 Accordingly, the defense should
submit a complete battery of Brady requests to obtain information
bearing on the defendant's sentence as well as the defendant's guilt.
Notably, the defense must ask for any exculpatory evidence that
contradicts the Commonwealth's theory of vileness or future dangerous-
ness. Because in Virginia the Commonwealth is allowed to introduce
prior bad acts, even unadjudicated crimes, it is critical thatBrady requests
specifically demand all exculpatory information pertaining to those acts,
including other suspects and leads.
48
Kyles is a warning to all prosecutors. The Court engaged in a fact-
bound inquiry in order to emphasize the prosecution's duty to reveal all
Brady evidence to the defense. Outraged by the prosecution's negligence
mony actually offered by Kyles's friends and family to show that Beanie
had framed Kyles." Id. at 1573 n.19.
44Id. at 1567.
451d. at 1569-70 n.13.
46Id.
47 373 U.S. at 87.
48 That this type of demand might be crucial to the defense's case
at sentencing can be seen in Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir.
1995). In Gray, the Commonwealth introduced an unadjudicated murder
as evidence at sentencing without revealing that the prime murder
suspect was initially someone other than the defendant. See case sum-
mary of Gray, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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in Kyles, the Court sent a strong message to prosecutors that they have a
duty to err on the side of disclosure.49 Kyles' broad reprimand to the
prosecution provides wonderful language to support defense requests for
49 The Court supports the notion that prosecutors in doubt should
lean toward disclosure by citing to United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at
108, and justifies that burden by claiming that it is the only way to create
an equitable balance at trial. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1568.
disclosure. The Court's eager appropriation of the Fifth Circuit dissent
should also inspire defense attorneys; capturing the attention of one
judge, even in dissent, can be an essential tool in later obtaining a new
trial for your client.
Summary and analysis by:
Courtney S. Townes
TUGGLE v. NETHERLAND
1995 WL 630932 (U.S.)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Lem Davis Tuggle was convicted in 1984 of capital murder com-
mitted during or subsequent to the rape of Ms. Jessie Geneva Havens. 1
He was sentenced to death after the jury found the Commonwealth had
proven both future dangerousness and vileness. 2 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence. 3 In 1985, the United
States Supreme Court vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the
Supreme Court of Virginia for reconsideration in light of Ake v. Okla-
homa 4 Ake held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence
of the defendant's future dangerousness at the sentencing phase, due
process requires that the defendant be provided an independent psychia-
trist to assist in the defense.
5
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
had indeed violated Ake (Tuggle II) by denying Tuggle an independent
psychiatrist to rebut the prosecution's psychiatric evidence as to future
dangerousness during the sentencing phase.6 Nonetheless, the Court
upheld Tuggle's conviction and sentence, concluding that because the
vileness factor was separately found by the jury in addition to future
dangerousness, the vileness factor alone was sufficient to sustain the
sentence under Virginia law.
7
Tuggle again petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court; this time he was denied.8 A subsequent petition for state habeas
relief was denied, as was his third petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.9 Tuggle then petitioned for federal habeas relief
to the District Court for the Western District of Virginia, raising ten
allegations.
The district court granted relief. The court found, inter alia, that (1)
the Supreme Court of Virginia had erred in upholding Tuggle's death
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1995).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
3 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984)
(Tuggle 1).
4470 U.S. 68 (1985).
5 Id. at 83.
6 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985)
(Tuggle II).
7 Id. at 108-11, 334 S.E.2d at 844-46.
8 Tuggle v. Virginia, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
9 Tuggle v. Bair, 503 U.S. 989 (1992).
10 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1361 (4th Cir. 1995).
11 Id.
sentence after striking future dangerousness as an aggravating circum-
stance and (2) the vileness instruction was unconstitutionally vague.10
As a result, the court vacated the sentence and ordered that Tuggle be
retried within six months.11 The Commonwealth appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. It found that the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Zant v. Stephens12 allowed
Tuggle's sentence to stand upon a finding of vileness after future
dangerousness had been thrown out under Ake. 13 It agreed with the
Supreme Court of Virginia that under Zant v. Stephens, theAke error did
not invalidate the jury's finding of vileness.14 Hence, it concluded that
the vileness finding was sufficient to support Tuggle's death sentence
and.reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief on this ground.
15
Tuggle again petitioned to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari and reversed the Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had
misinterpretedZant v. Stephens. The Court explained that whileZant did
hold that the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance "does not
necessarily require setting aside a death penalty, ' 16 Zant does not
support the proposition that "the existence of a valid aggravator always
excuses a constitutional error in the admission or exclusion of evi-
dence." 17 Where ajury has heard "materially inaccurate evidence,"Zant
does not apply to support a death sentence. 18 Because the jury in
Tuggle's case had heard inadmissible evidence which could have af-
fected their ultimate decision to impose death, the Court vacated the
Fourth Circuit'sjudgment. 19 The Courtremanded to the lowercourts for
consideration of whether a harmless-error analysis were applicable.
20
12462 U.S. 862 (1983).
13 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1374.
14 Id.
15 Id. For the Foruth Circuit's analysis in reversing the district
court's finding that the vileness instruction was too vague, see case
summary of Tuggle v. Thompson, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
16 Tuggle v. Netherland, No. 95-6016,1995 WL 63 0932, at *2 (U.S.
Oct. 30, 1995) (per curiam) (emphasis in the original).
17Id.
18 Id. The court cited the holding of Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S.
578 (1988) for this proposition.
19 Id.
20 Id.
